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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R. M. SCOVILLE,

Appellant,
Case No.
7824

vs.
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of facts
where such are facts and not arguments or mere conclusions. Because of the length of the facts set out, we believe it will serve the interest and convenience of the
court to refrain from restating all of the facts but to
merely point out a few of the following:
On page 4 in the last sentence in the first paragraph, the word ubuilding" should ·be ubilling."
In the first paragraph on page 5, Mr. Leslie Carl
Borsum should be designated as an employee of Kellogg
Company, (R. 84) and that appellant testified that Mr.
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Borsum was sales manager for the U. S. for Kellogg Sales
Company.
In all. three paragraphs on page 5, appellant indulges
in arguments and conclusions by stating that reasonable
inferences Ctcould be," ucan be" and umay be" drawn
from the respective conversations. The conversations are
set out in the record and the briefs and speak for themselves. In like manner the last paragraph beginning on
page 5 and ending on page 6 contains the statement that
an inference may be .drawn from a letter written July
24, 1949. This letter (Exhibit 10) speaks for itself.
In the last paragraph on page 6, the statement that
Mr. Scoville protested several times orally to Mr. Williams and Mr. Borsum should conform to the record. A
more accurate condensation of this would be that Mr.
Scoville talked with Mr. Williams several times about the
bonus·, but what was said about these things would be
just short and he couldn't repeat them for the court.
(R. 28 ). He protested in several talks with. Mr. Williams
and Mr. Borsum in Minneapolis the following January.
(R. 72).
The third paragraph on page 8 should state the
check for $1,026.98 transmitted by the letter dated April
25, 1950, was specified in the letter as representing the
balance due on Mr. Scoville's bonus for 1949.
·STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1

THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PAROL EVIDENCE
OFFERED BY APPELLANT TO VARY, MODIFY OR CONTRADICT A WRITTEN. INSTRUMENT.
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POINT 2
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF TiiE WITNESS, BORSUM, ON TiiE GROUND SUCH
TESTIMONY WAS NOT BINDING UPON KELLOGG SALES
COMPANY.
POINT 3
TiiE COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDiCT IN
FAVOR OF TiiE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF

POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PAROL
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY APPELLANT TO VARY,
MODIFY OR CONTRADICT A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT.
Respondent respectfully points out to this court that
Points I and II of appdlant's brief are diametrically op- ·
posed to each other and so inconsistent as to preclude
relief under either. Because of this inconsistency, we will
discuss Points I and II of appellant's brief together.
We do not quarrel with appellant's authorities cited
in Point I which support the rule that a subsequent agreement may be shown by parol evidence to vary or modify
a written instrument. Parker vs. Weber County Irr.
Dist., 65 Utah 354, 236 Pac. 1105 (Utah 19~5); Hogan
vs. Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 Pac. 1097 (Utah 1925);
32 C. J. S., Section 1004, at page 1008. Under Point I
appellant apparently claims that the alleged conversations were admissible because they were made prior to
the 1949 written instrument and were made to modify,
vary or contradict the 1948 bonus plan, yet he seeks to
recover on the terms of the 1948 written instrument on
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the theory that such instrument remained in effect for
him for services performed in 1949.
In Point II he asserts that such conversations were
admissible, though prior to the receipt and acknowledgment of the 1949 instrument, to show that a different
agreement existed between the parties than was represented in the 1949 instrument. In other words, parol
evidence or conversations prior in time to the 1949 instrument were purportedly admissible to show that Scoville, the appellant and plaintiff, had never assented to
the 1949 agreement before it was written and, therefore,
the conversations were admissible to abrogate the same.
We submit that the following facts are undisputed
in the record. First, that the 1949 written instrument,
called the 1949 Bonus Plan, was received and acknowledged. by Scoville in 1949. Second, that Scoville received
a statement of his account and payments under the 1949
bonus plan. Third, that the conversations designated in
Point I as admissible were made prior to the receipt of
the 1949 written instrument.
Considering the assertion that the alleged conversations related to the 1948 instrument, we cite from the
general rule given as authority by appellant and contained
in 32 C. ]. S., Section 1004 at pages 1009-10.

**

It must appear, however, that there was
a subsequent agreement, mere negotiations or representations being insufficient; and it is usually necessary that such subsequent agreement be founded on
a consideration, although a contrary view has been
asserted. * * * " (italics ours.)
u
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The conversations Mr. Scoville testified to and relied upon by inference to alter, vary or contradict a written instrument speak for themselves. Here are the pertient parts:
At breakfast in Portland Mr. Borsum allegedly said:
uHe said: cHe didn~t see any reason why the
bonus should be changed at that time, there was
nothing that should be changed in the setup, for
1949. He also stated the thing he would want me
to do, when I got my bonus, was to buy a home and
settle down in it. I had been traveling too much.
uHe said: cl think if you would spend about
$4,000.00 for a home it would be adequate for ·you
and Helen to live in.'" (R. 23-24.) (italics ours)
In the hotel room in Omaha, Nebraska, the pertinent parts of the conversation as related by Mr. Scoville were:

ui asked both Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams,
if they thought I had about enough turkey contracts in this territory.
uAnd Mr. Williams stated I should go ahead
and sell all the contracts I could. He ,could make the
feed. He was in charge of the Omaha Plant.
ul said: tyou are also going to pay me a lot of
bonus too.'
uHe said: cwe have got money to pay the
bonus, you sell the feed.'
UThen we left the .room and started downstairs.
cc;Q. Who left the room?
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uA. Mr. Borsum, Mr. Williams and myself
left the room to go downstairs.

ttl said: (Bill, it will take a lot of feed, and I
will get a lot of bonus, it is pretty near time to shut
Qtf out there.'
uHe said: (We will take care of you, Kellogg
has got plenty of money and we will make the

feed/ " (R. 25-26)

.

Mrs. Scoville testified about the same conversation
in general terms. (R. 79)
Appellant claims that these statements, made prior
to the 1949 written instrument, infer uthat there would
be a bonus for the year 1949 and that such bonus would
be computed at the rate of $2.00 per ton of feed sold
as which [sic] is the same rate provided in the agreement of 1948."
We agree that the parties inferred that there would
be a bonus for 1949. The only conclusion that can be
reached is that a bonus plan for 1949 was anticipated.
The last paragraph of the 1948 bonus plan specifically
so provides:
uof course this means that' we will look at the
situation at the end of 1948 and see if this is the
best possible .bonus arrangement, both from the
standpoint of the individual salesman and the Kellogg CQmpany." ,
. To· designate. a statement made by one of the parties
that he usaw no reason why the bonus ·should be changed
at .that time'' · as having the effect of an offer that it
wouldn't be changed in the future does violence to even
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an inference. It is interesting to note that whenever Mr.
Scoville mentioned a sum of $30,000.00, ·the ·other party
returned with a statement similar to uh~ emphatically
stated he would like very much for us to find a home
somewhere and buy it, he thought a $4,000.00-home
would be adequate for us." (R.. 24, 78) Similarly, no
inference such as appellant seeks can be found in either
the statement uYou are going to ·pay me a lot .of. bonus
too" or the answer uwe have got money to pay the bonus,
you sell the feed." Although Mrs. Scoville was not a
party to the agreement, she testified that the conversation just referred to took place prior to the time the 1949
bonus plan was received by her husband.

If we must indulge in inferences in an attempt to
vary a written instrument, the most that can be inferred
is that a plan for 1949 was expected to be .announced
some time in 1949. Mrs. Scoville knew her husband
received or had received the 1949 bonus plan in July or
August of 1949 and she had read it. (R. 79-80)
She also knew that it had been discussed and anticipated:

ul know there was a lot of quibble, a lot of
quibble going on the latter part of July about the
payment of this. It is possible Mr. Scoville did
get a letter from them· with reference to it, but
this did not come out until after the correspondence
in July was concluded." (R. 80)
We respectfully submit to this court that all·converversations upon which appellant attempted· to rely
refer to the 1949 written instrument providing for a
bonus plan in that year, and nowhere in the record is
there any affirmative evidence of a promise or offer of
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anything different. The most comfort appellant can
glean from such iconversations would be that they were
uinerely negotiations or representations," and such are
insufficient to establish any substantial uagreement.'' 32
C. J. S. Section 1004, pp. 1008-10.
In the case of Hogan vs. Swayze, supra, the elementary rule is given:
·
ult may be said in passing, however, that the
rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the
terms of a plain, unambiguous instrument, in writing, is elementary in this and every other jurisdiction of the country."
By plaintiff's . very pleading and testimony, he seeks
to recover on the theory that the bonus plan for 1949
received in July or August of that year was varied,
changed or modified by prior oral conversations or agreements, and thus it did not apply to him. It is the terms
of the 1949 bonus plan that plaintiff seeks to escape and
in open court so stated as shown by the record at page
2 3, set out in appellant's brief at page 13:
uMR. CALLISTER: If the court please, it is
no attempt to vary a written contract, it is an attempt to vary one not received until July or
August, 1949. This conversation took place the
latter ·part of 1948."
It should not now be counsel's pleasure to say he
did not mean what he said.
The 1948 bonus plan expired at the end of 1948,
and Mr. Scoville was paid according thereto for his serv·
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ices for that. year. As set out heretofore, the 1948 bonus
plan specifically stated that it was the bonus plan for
1948 and that it would be reexamined at the end of that
year.
Subsequent to the conversations testified to by Mr.
Scoville, the 1949 writing was sent to Mr. Scoville who
acknowledged receipt of it (R. 18, 19, 3~, 56, 62, 63). He
thereafter acknowledged a statement of his accounts and
payments in accordance with such writing and made no
formal protest until some seventeen months after he received it. This bonus plan was admitted into evidence
without objection as Mr. Scoville's Exhibit uB" and in
part provides as follows: ·
ult is the company's desire to be fair to its employees, to its stockholders, and to the company
itself.
·
ult is management's thinking that each man is
worthy of his hire, but we do have certain limitations which we must consider on an allover basis
insofar as the company is concerned.
uThe bonus plan -covered in Bulletin #148-3
dated January 29, 1948 expired as of December 31,
1948. .The bonus plan for 1949 ·which we feel is
fair to all concerned is as follows:

CREDIT TOWARD BONUS
First 2,000 tons of feed sold
(hog, cattle, turkey and
poultry)

.50 per ton allowance

Balance of financed feed
sold
1. 00 per ton allowance
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All non-financed feeds
sold

2.00 per ton allowance

uAgainst your b~n\ls credit will be charged
your territory expense al').d salary. We feel that
the above bonus plan is an equitable one as far as
the company and the salesmen are concerned, especially when· you consider that most of the salesmen
in the feed department are now members of the
Kellogg Sales Company Savings Plan and participate in the profits of the company.

* * *
uThe above bonus plan covers 1949 operation only."

* * ".
There is no ambiguity in this statement, uThe bonus
plan covered in Bulletin #148-3 dated January 29, 1948
e~pired as of December 31, 1948." The only purported
conversation testified to after the bonus plan for 1949 was
received by him allegedly took place in Minneapolis on
January 9, 1949, when the follow:ing was said:
·"".A. Mr. Borsum told me I would have to
follow ·the new schedule of· the bonus· which was
issued in August, that he had sent out, and that he
didn't think it was a good thing that I should
make any trouble about it or say anything, or discuss it, because that is the way it was and that is
the way it had to be.
.

'

uThf}t if anything was said, if I took it up
with the higher.:.ups both him arid Mr. Williams and
myself would all lose our jobs, and if I kept my
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mouth shut· I could stay on inde:finiteJy as long as
I was doing the job." (R. 29)
Here certainly is no protest nor does it indicate anything but an acceptance of the 1949 writing, and the
subsequent events confirm such acceptance. A letter
dated January 10, 1950 was written .by Mr. Williams to
Mr. Scoville. It is designated as Exhibit u3'' and provides:
uDear Ray:

uwe are discontinuing the Bonus Plan which
was in effect in 1949 and we will not have a Bonus
Plan for 1950.
uwe are advancing your salary··effective January 1, 1950 from $325.00 per month to $375.00
per month.

ccThis will confirm our recent conversation."
It is apparent from this letter that the company and
Mr. Williams had considered the bonits plan for 1949 in
effect, for it was specifically discontinued. Thereafter,
on January 30, 1950, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. Scoville
enclosing a check for his bonus for the year 1949 and a
statement of the sales and calculations. The letter (Exhibit
u6") is only two paragraphs ~ong, and for the convenience
of the court we cite these two paragraphs:
uDearRay:
uPlease :find enclosed, our check· in the amount
of $3544.35 to cover Bonus for the year 1949. Also
:find enclosed a statement showing the feed sales,
whether financed. or non-financed, and the calculation based on ·the Bonus Plan for 1949. ·
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ttlt was necessary to go ahead and clean this
matter up based on the figures we have, but subject
to revision, if the figures which you are sending
-prove ours to be· incorrect. We will appreciate
having you forward Helen's :figures as soon as possible so we can check this out, but we did have to
close our books for 1949 and that is the reason
for going ahead and making the calculation."
It is apparent the check and statement were for payment under the 1949 bonus p~an. In fact, Exhibit u7",
a letter written February 10, 1950 acknowledges receipt
of the check, for Mr. Scoville had returned it due to an
errQr mthe deduction of withholding tax. Mr. Scoville
does not deny the circumstances surrounding the letter.
In fact, he admitted having the original. (R. 49-50).

On February 6, 1950, a check in the amount of
$2,981.92 representing the amount of the previous check
less withholding tax was drawn· payable to Scoville and
received, endorsed and cashed by him. (R. 51-52) . On
April 25, 1950 a letter was sent to Mr. Scoville enclosing·
a check in the amount of $1,026.88 representing the balance due on his bonus for 1949. (Exhibit uS"). Mr. Scoville was praised for his work for 1949, and told that the
company had a great deal of money outstanding on his
accounts in this area and that they were going to hold him
responsible for getting the money in. The following statement in that letter requires no further ·explanation:
~ uAttached find

check in the amount of
$1,026.·88.representing balance due on your bonus
for 1949."
·
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Exhibit u9" is a statement of Mr. Scoville's account
under the 1949 plan. It was the subject of some controversy, but Mr. Scoville admitted receiving a statement of
his accounts and for feed tonnage (R. 52) and that
Exhibit u9, may or may not be the statement he received.
(R. 53) . Subsequently he adopted the :figures therein as
his own and the exhibit was admitted in evidence (R. 7 4) •
Mr. Scoville accepted the checks, endorsed and cashed
them. Thereafter no protest, complaint nor demands of
any kind were made by Mr. Scoville until December 30,
1950, the day before his retirement became effective.
Appellant alleges in his brief that Mr. Scoville protested
several times orally to Mr. Williams concerning the 1949
writing (appellant's brief 24-25). The record ·shows
what is relied on for a positive protest orally in the excerpted references to the record.

uQ. Now, after receiving that bulletin,
Exhibit B, did you enter a protest or talk with any
of the officials of the company?
uA. Not at the - I wrote them a letter at
that time but there was nothing more said about it.
uQ. Did you ever have any conversation
with Mr. Williams subsequently to the time you
received that bonus - that exhibit?
uA. Well, Mr. Williams and I talked a lot of
times whenever he was with me, about the bonus,
but what was said about these things would just be
very short and I can't repeat it." (R. 28)

* * *
ceQ. I am asking, and you have told ·me, it is
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you were afraid of losing your job was the reason
you didn't protest before, - I am asking if there
were any other reasons you didn't make active
protest?
. uA. I had made several in talks, in conversations to Mr. Williams and Mr. Borsum when in
Minneapolis in January, I wasn't in a shape to accept anything, I accepted anything they had in
mind because I wasn't all together." (R. 72)
Appellant gives as a reason for no protest after receiving the letters set out above and the receipt of the :figur~
and th~ cashing of checks, that he feared losing his job.
The cross examination of Mr. Scoville is revealing:

UBY MR. AADNESEN:

uQ. Just one or two more questions. Do you
have any idea of the policy of the company at the
time you joined it, as to the age of retirement?
ttA.

Did I have?

ttQ.

Yes.

uQ. When was that?
u.A. ~ey could retire me at 60, or could
retire me a~ 65. (R. 72-73)

* * *
uQ. Mr. Scoyille, Mr. Aadnesen also asked
·you on cross examination about your retiring from
Kellogg's, ·will you explain retiring from Kellogg's?

uA.

I

ret~red

January 1, 1951.
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uQ.
uA.
(R. 68)

Was that voluntary upon your part?

They make it voluntary in a

nice way.

* * *
<<Q. 1950. Now, at that time what was your
status with the company? ·.
ttA.

I was on my way out.

uQ.

You were retired, weren't you?

ttA.

Yes sir.

uQ.

And you retired, did you not?

uQ.

You

uA.

As far as Kellogg's were concerned.

uQ.

And you had retired effective what date?

uA.

January 1, 1951.

retire~

did you not?

uQ. So this was written .just on the eve of
your effective date of retirement, was it not?
uA

Yes sir." (R. 62)

The record . shows that Mr. Sc.oville was 65 years of
age in April, 1952. He was subject to retirement and.
could have retired or been retired any time since 1947,
and he knew it
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In Point I of his brief, appellant seeks to escape the
elementary rule of parol evidence announced by our
court in Hogan vs. Swayze, supra, by alleging that all
conversations relating to bonus payments for services performed in 1949 related to the 1948 bonus plan. It is perforce admitted by appellant that if these related to the
1949 bonus plan they were made prior to the acknowledgment and receipt of the 1949 plan and would be inadmissible under the. foregoing rule. We submit that the
only affirmative evidence in the record conclusively establishes that such conversations referred to a bonus plan
for 1949 and show concern for what the terms of such a
plan would be. Most certainly, as Mr. Callister informed
the court, they are an uattempt to vary one not received
until July or August, 1949." (R. 23). The court was
most certainly entitled to rely upon information from
counsel as to the purpose of these conversations, and
appellant should not now attempt to escape their inadmissibility by claiming they relate to a prior or an entirely separate agreement.
· In Point II of appellant's brief, the position is taken
that parol evidence to prove a prior oral agreement different in its terms from a purported written agreement
is admissible. This statement is in direct conflict with
the authorities cited in Point I. Appellant then goes on
to say that the trial court erred in excluding testimony
adduced to prove the verbal agreement different in its
terms ·from the purported written agreement which was
never assented to. Appellant then states at page 23 of his
brief uA writing was introduced in evidence which
was subsequent to the conversations and the implied
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agreement, which writing the Company contended was a
written agreement which could not be modified by parol
evidence." The inconsistency between Point I and Point
II is readily apparent and conclusive upon the appella~t
that the only purpose of the alleged conversations could
be to modify, vary or abrogate the 1949 writing.
Appellant asserts that he. never assented to the 1949
bonus plan, and hence it was not the agreement between
the parties. We respectfully submit that both the 1948
and the 1949 plans were letters similar in form and content. They were sent and received and payment computed in accordance to their respective terms at the expiration of the 1948 and. 1949 periods. The only affirmative, undisputed evidence is that Mr. Scoville received
and acknowledged the 1949 plan.

uQ.

(BY MR. CALLISTER) Well, Mr. Scoville, did you ever receive any communication by
word, or by letter, or bulletin,.that the 1948 bonus
arrangement was terminated?
teA.

Yes sir.

uQ.

And when was that?

uA.
August.

In August is the first, the last of July or

uQ.

Of what years?

uA.

1949. (R. 18)

* * *
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uQ. Do you, recall. writing to the company
on January 24th, 1949, from. Idaho Falls, Idaho?
u.A.. l couldn't tell you what the date was, I
wrote so many letters - we wrote so many letters,
I don't knpw. whether I wrote from·· Idaho Falls or
not. I was all over this western territory. - I
wouldn't answer it that way.

uQ. Perhaps I can refresh your recollection,
did you write this letter?
uA.

I did.

uQ. .The first part of which you read,-right
here, - and tell me whether you know now the
date of the bonus plan of 1949?
uA.

Which paragraph do you mean?

((Right here where you have your thumb.
uA.

Right here?

(Also your letter of July 11th, regarding the
bonU.S plan, which of course is very important to
me, I have read it very carefully, but I am not
ready to give you my thoughts on it for my feed
business is practically assured from the start. And
{rom the wording of this letter I can see where it
could be changed tp where I would not get any
bonus. ·
~Not

only that Les, - '

uQ.

That has nothing to do with it.

uA.

It is still in the paragraph.
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MR. QUINNEY: Let him read it.
ttQ.
read it?

(by Mr. Aadnesen) . Do you want to

uA. It doesn't make any
you don't want to read.

differen~e

to me, if

uQ. You acknowledged receipt of the bonus
plan for 1949, didn't you?
uA.

Yes sir.

ttQ.

That is dated July 11th, isn't that cor-

ttA.
about.

According to that letter it is talked

rect?

«tQ.

This is your letter, Mr. Scoville?

uA.

That is right." (R. 32-3 3)

Even the alleged conversation in Minneapolis indicates that he accepted it because he did not want to lose
his job. He stated that· he received a statement 'of his
accounts for 1949 under this agreement which appellant
designates as upurported," and thereafter received and
returned one check because no withholding tax had been
deducted. He received, endorsed and cashed two subsequent checks representing payments under the· 1949 writing. All this he did without murmur or complaint and
then waited nearly a year to register a complaint.
There is no dispute to this evidence and appellant
admits it in his brief~ No jury question presents itself
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from undiSputed evidence~ and the court was faced with
a question of law, upon which he ruled. As will be pointed
out hereafter· under another point appellant was estopped
to deny the 1949 writing and his actions established accord
and satisfaction or an account stated, upon which grounds
the court properly granted a directed verdict for the
defendant.
Appellant indicates that Mr. Scoville had done all of
his work and all of the contracts had been sent in to the
company prior to July 1, 1949, and that the 1949 bonus
plan received thereafter could not apply to him. The
record reflects the procedure of Mr. Scoville and the company in selling and in reality _sh~ws the contrary. The
1948 bonus applied to all feeds as did the 1949 bonus
plan. However, the 1949 bonus plan provided a bonus
of 50 cents per ton on the first 2,000 tons of financed
feed, and $1.00 per ton on the balance of financed feed
sold. All nonfinanced feed sold carried a bonus of $2.00
per ton. Exhibit ((9" shows Mr. Scoville received a credit
of $1,330.00 for .665 .tons of non:fi.nanced feed at $2.00
per ton, $1,000.00 for 2,000 _tons of financed- feed at 50
cents a ton, and $12,452.00 for 12,452 tons at $1.00 per
ton. In fact, after .deducting his salary and expenses paid
him during the year amounting to $10,971.67 he received
an additional $4,7 42.3 3 in bonus, a total f~r the year of
$15,714.00. The Kellogg Sales Company had its own
turkey financing program and they wanted all the feed
possible. Mr. Scoville was to call on the de.alers and
customers that used the feed and the dealers WO\lld get
the turkey men to sign the contracts. The dealers would
check the contracts off and send them to Mr. Williams at
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Omaha. The Omaha office would take care of them and
send the contracts containing the program for the
customers to use during that year back to Scoville and
the customer after they were approved. These were estimates of the amount of feed the customer would require
and some would use less than the estimate and some
wouldn't use any but cancel out. During the year, the
dealers of Scoville notified Omaha what amount of feed
was needed and it took about ten days to come out. When
it was shipped, Scoville received invoices, and these invoices are what he used for his tonnage :figures to figure
his bonus payments. He had no idea how much feed was
shipped prior to July, 1949. We respectfully submit that
the court may take judicial notice of the feeding
habits of turkeys during the year and the fact that Thanksgiving was late in November, 1949.

POINT 2

THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS, BORSUM,
ON THE GROUND SUCH TESTIMONY WAS NOT
BINDING UPON KELLOGG SALES CO:MPANY.
Mr. Scoville was employed by Kellogg Sales Company.
He knew there were two companie~, Kellogg Sales Company and Kellogg Company.

UBY MR. AADNESEN:

uQ. I have just ·a few questions, Mr. Scoville,
I think it best to begin at the beginning where you
did.
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· uYou stated ·you were first employed August
15, 1944?
uA.

Yes, I think that is correct.

uQ

That is the Kellogg Sales Company?

uA. · Yes.
uQ. You have never worked for Kellogg
Company?
((A. At that time I think both of them were
more or less together.
uQ.

Do you know?

uA. If anybody could keep up with them, I
couldn't, whether they was single companies or
whether they was parent companies.
t.:Kellogg Company is-

_.:.:Q•. You understand they are two separate
companies?
u

.!)...

Yes sir.

.:.<Q. - You worked for Kellogg Sales Company,
is that correct?
uA. · I had a savings· fund in Kellogg Com··pany, as well as Kellogg Sales Company." (R. 29)
Mr. Scoville also stated that he knew Mr. Borsum was
sales manager for the U.S. for the Kellogg Sales Company.
He testified that he knew this of his own knowledge be-
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cause he got the information from Mr. Borsum himself.
The general rule of law regarding an admissible statement
and declarations by one alleged to be the agent of another
is well stated in 20 Am. Jur. 508, §598:
((There is a general rule that the admissions,
statements, and declarations of one alleged to be
the agent of another, other than his testimony in
the case in which the issue arises, are not admissible
either to prove the fact of his agency or the extent
of his authority as an agent. It follows that as a
general rule the preliminary proof of agency requisite to render the statements of one p~rson admissible against another must be made by evidence
other than declarations of the alleg~d agent, not
brought to the knowledge of the principal."
The case of Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 21 A. 2d
396, 136 ALR 226, reiterates the rule:
ult is well settled that authority of an agent
cannot be proven by declarations of .the agent,
Bailey v. Bobecki, 117 Conn. 653, 654, 166 A 677;
Voegeli v. Waterbury Yellow Cab Co., 111 Conn.
407, 411, 150 A 303, 69 ALR 902; Taylor v.
Commercial Bank, 174 NY 181, 191, 66 NE 726,
62 LRA 783, 95 Am St. Rep 564; 2 Am Jur 357."
What Mr. Kellogg said Mr. Borsum.had ·said does not
constitute evidence sufficient to establish Mr. Borsum as
having the authority to bind Kellogg. Sales Company.
Mr. Borsum was called as a witness and testified that
he was employed by Kellogg Company. (R. 8 3). Appellant
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ice and authority to bind the corporate defendant when
Mr. Borsum was on the stand. If such was the case as they
maintain, appel\ant cannot now rely upon the lack of
testimony resulting from his failure to adduce testimony.
Andersonv. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142.
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove
his case and to now say there was no evidence that during ·
the time in question in this action Mr. Borsum was not
employed by Kellogg Sales Company, or that it can be ·
inferred that he had authority to bind Kellogg Sales Company at the time of the convers·ations, is an attempt to
place this burden upon the defendant. The authorities are
all in agreement upon such a proposition. In 20 Am. Jur.
508, § 597, the rule is stated:
uThe burden of proof lies upon the party who
introduces the-statements of an agent for the purpose of binding the principal to show that the
declarations were within the agent's authority."

This burden of proof requires more than a mere statement, and it must be shown that not only was there
competency, but the admissions must have been made in
the discharge of the agent's duty and must be a statement
of fact rather than an expression of opinion. This rule is
well stated in 31 C.J.S., § 343 at page 1115.
uCompetency of the agent to make admissions
on the ~ubject is not alone sufficient; the admission
which it is sought to use must have been made in
connection with the discharge of the agent's duty,
and must be a statement of fact, rather than an
expression of opinion."
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S. W. Bridges & Co. v. Candland et al., 88 Utah 373,
54 P. 2d 842. This principle was adopted in a direct quotation from Corpus Juris in the case of Fish Lake Resort
Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al., 73 Utah 479,
275 P. 580.

A ree:x;amination of the statements alleged to have
been made by Mr. Borsum could only result in the con~
elusion that they are not statements of fact but conclusions. The only statements alleged to have been made were
to the effect that the amount of feed Mr. Scoville said he
would sell would be a lot of feed, and that the company
had money to pay a bonus if he· sold the feed,- and that
he didn't see any reason why the bonus should be changed
at that time. There is nowhere in the record any 'clear or
convincing evidence of any statement . by Mr. Borsum
which could constitute any basis upon which Mr. Scoville
could predicate a recovery in this case.
Much has been said about the conversations of Mr.
Borsum in Minneapolis, and it has been pointed out that
Mr. Scoville apparently accepted Mr. Borsum's statement
to the effect that he had to accept the 1949 bonus as it
was and that was the way it had to be. This very state~
ment that if anything was said, or if Mr. Borsum talked
to the higher-ups, he and Mr. Williams and Mr. Scoville
would lose their jobs, negatives authority to bind the
company rather than support it. In Sweatman v. Linton
et al., 66 Utah 208, 241 P. 309, this .court ruled on·a similar
statement. There the purported a~nt and his principal
were sued for malicious prosecution. In reversing the
judgment for the plaintiff ·and in ruling that the motions
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for non-suit and directed verdict on behalf of the Packing
Company should have been granted; the court discussed
the· following:
u * * Plaintiff was again placed upon the witness stand and, over o,jection by defendants, testified that after his ·arrest and return to Price, and
while he was out on bail, he met Linton on a street
in that city. He also testified ( q~oting from the
bill of exceptions) further as follows:
u cAfter we met and he offered me his hand,
he $aid (I'm glad to see you.' I put my hand behind
me and I said, ci can't say as much for you.' I
kind ·of rebuffed him and expressed some feeling.
He stepped off and said: (Mr. Sweatman, I'm sorry
you feel that way about it. It was nothing that I
could help. I was ordered to do this by the company.' I argued with Crum (secretary of the packing comp~ny) that I didn't want to do it, but he
says, cyou go and do it,' and I was working for him,
and it was up to me to do it or quit.'
uThe packing company assigns the admission
of that testimony as error. In our judgment the
testimony was clearly inadmissible for the purpose
of binding t~e packing company. It was not a statement of the· agent as to the limit or extent of his
authority in the transaction of 'any business intru,sted.to him under his general employment, even
if it be contended that it was admissible as defining the extent of his agency. The introduction of
the evidence was an attempt by hearsay to bind the
company upon a question admittedly not within
the general scope of the agent's duty. * * *"
The similarity between this statement and the statement
allegedly made by Mr. Borsum is most striking.
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We submit that these. alleged .statements, were inad...
missible under the rules set out above and that the evi9ence
was insufficient to affirmatively establish that Mr. Borsum
had authority to bind Kellogg Sales Company. We
respectfully point out to the court also that the ruling
by the court could not constitute prejudicial error where
appellant's counsel informed the court they were introduced to vary or modify a written instrument.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
The defendant moved the court for a directed verdict,
which motion the court granted. In Point IV of appellant's brief he asserts that uThe trial court erred in directing a verdict for the company after wrongly excluded
testimony which tended to establis/.J the case for Mr.
Scoville." This statement acknowledges that if the testimony which was excluded was not considered by the court,
the granting of a directed verdict is correct, with which
proposition we agree. Respondent moved. the court for
a directed verdict upon the following grounds and for
the following reasons:
.
eel. The only competent evidence shows,
1948 bonus plan ended December 31, 1948, and
any objection, and any allegation, or contention
that said plan continue into all, or part of 1949 is
against the law and evidence in this case.

u2.

The evidence shows the 1949 bonus plan
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specifically is unambiguous and with certainty
provided the' method for payment fo:r all bonuses
or commissions for the year 1949, and the whole
thereof, and in like manner verified and specified
the termination of the 1948 bonus plan as of December 31, 1948.
u3. The contracts for bonuses for 1948-1949
are not ambiguous or uncertain, and cannot be
varied by parol evidence as a matter of law, and
must be strictly construed by this court, and so
construed specifically provide and require the application of the bonus provision of 1949 only
to apply to the commissions of the plaintiff for
that year.
u4. The undisputed evidence shows that
plaintiff received and acknowledged receipt of the
1949 bonus contract from the defendant in July
of 1949. That he continued in his employment
thereafter, and that subsequent to 1949 he received a final statement of his account for bonuses
for 1949, together with checks in payment therefor.
uThat he failed to object thereto until many
months thereafter.
uThat, by reason of this ~conduct he is estopped
to deny the existence or validity of the 1949 contract, and that contract was made as payment
in full.
u5. The undisputed evidence establishes the
receipt of a statement of account for the balance
of plaintiff's bonus for 1949, and checks therefor,
which plaintiff cashed without protest or offer
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to return, coupled with a failure to object to that
within a reasonable time, and therefore said account became an account stated, or further, by
reason of the circumstances and conduct of the
parties prior to said acceptance and cashing, such
constituted an accord and satisfaction, and in
either event are conclusive upon him, and plaintiff cannot recover." (R. 85-86)
Since appellant's position is limited to a consideration by the court of evidence which was not the subject
of a motion to strike because it was inadmissible, only the
third ground of the motion for a directed verdict appears
to be complained of by- him. We have already discussed
the question of the admissibility -of parol evidence and
wlll not revert to that argument. Admittedly, then, if
any of the other four grounds upon which the motion for
a directed verdict is good, the court did not err.
But even if we consider the evidence with the stricken
testimony back in the record, and considering all the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, we :find
the following to be wholly undisputed in the record:
The plaintiff received and acknowledged receipt
of the 1949 Bonus Plan from the defendant in July or
August of 1949.
1.

The 1949 Bonus Plan specifically stated that the
1948 Bonus Plan was terminated as of December 31, 1948.
2.

In January of 1950 plaintiff received notification
that the Bonus Plan which had been in effect for 1949
was discontinued and his salary was increased to $375 per
month, without any Bonus Plan for 1950.
3.
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4. Plaintiff received a letter dated January 30, 1950
enclosing a check for $3,544.35 to cover his Bonus for
1949, calculated on the terms of the 1949 bonus plan and
subject to revision if the :figures plaintiff was. sending to
the company proved the company's :figures incorrect.
5. Because of an error in failing to deduct his withholding tax plaintiff returned the check for $3,544.35
and thereafter received a letter dated February 10, 1950
thanking him for returning it and informing him that
another check for the same amount less withholding tax
had been sent to him. The letter also stated that the company was in the process of checking Mrs. Scoville's :figures
on shipments and would make a complete adjustment as
soon as those :figures had been audited. The check for
$2,9 81.9 2 was received by Mr. Scoville.

6. Plaintiff received a letter dated April 25, 1950
enclosing a check for $1,026.88. The letter specifically
stated the ,check represented the balance due on plaintiff's
bonus for .1949.
7. The checks for $2,981.92 and $1,026.88 were
endorsed and cashed by plaintiff.

8. Plaintiff informed the company of his retirement
effective January 1, 19 51· and wrote his first protest on
''the eve of his retirement, December 30, 1950, some seventeen months after receipt· of the. 1949 Bonus Plan and
some eight months after a final statement of his 1949 bonus
had been rendered and payment made thereunder.

These foregoing facts are in chronological order and
are wholly undisputed in the record. It is clear from these
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facts that the conduct and actions of Scoville in accepting
his statement of account and his payments for 1949 computed according to the 1949 plan, preclude any present
contention by him that he did so under protest. By such
conduct he is estopped to deny the existence or validity of
the 1949 plan and its application to him. He had many
opportunities to protest, and if he seriously thought at
those times that he was entitled to bonus payments under
the 1948 plan or any other agreement different than the
1949 plan, he surely would have registered some ~complaint.
Twice in January he was written, once informing him .of
the termination of the 1949 Bonus Plan and once enclosing a check to pay him his bonus in 1949 according to the
1949 plan. No protest occurred-in fact, he even sent
the check back because of a ta~ deduction error, without
complaint or even politely informing his company that
the 1949 plan didn't apply to him. After the alleged ~con
versations such as ttWith the bonus figured the way they
are now, I am going to make a lot of money, around
$30,000.00," and uYou are also going to .pay me a lot of
bonus too," he cannot be heard to assert that the difference
between $3,544.35 and the additional $16,183.53 alleged
in his complaint went unnoticed. Nor did he protest
about the check for $2,981.92 even after his wife's :figures
were sent and audited and he knew the 1949 Bonus Plan
was used to compute the amount due. And even when
the :final check for $1,026.88 and a letter explaining that
the check represented ((balance due on your bonus for
1949" arrived, Mr. and Mrs. _Scoville remained mute for
some eight months about the failure to receive a sum in
excess of $16,000.00, more than once again as much as
he had received for the whole year of 1949 in salary,
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bonuses and expenses. He also knew he would receive no
bonus for 1950 and only Q salary of $375.00 per month
and expenses.
Appellant has filled his brief with uinferences," but
here are the stark, unadorned facts, not mere inferences,
facts conclusively establishing an account stated or accord
and satisfaction. These principles of law are stated in the
alternative because of their distinct application to the
undisputed facts in this case, and a discussion of the two
principles will better illustrate this.
The legal principle of an account stated has been
recognized and applied by this court since the first volume of the Utah Reports. In Wm. S. Godbe v. Brigham
Young, 1 Utah 55, the plaintiff had in the spring of 1865
advanced to the defendant goods of the value of $10,020.27
to be used in the construction of the Deseret Irrigation
and Canal Co. Thereafter on the 12th day of February,
1866, the plaintiff properly rendered an account to the
defendant for the stated balance to which defendant made
no protest. The court held that an account was stated
and was conclusive:
u* * tif the Defendant did not object within
a reasonable time to an account presented to him,
his assent may be presumed, and will support an
action upon an account stated; and also that, (if
when an account is rendered no objection is made
to it, it i~ to be considered liquidated from the time
it is rendered.' (Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns.,
409; Hall v. Morrison, 3 Bosw., 520; Case v.
Hotchkiss, 3 Abb. N. S. 381; Hutchinson v. Bank,
48 Barv., 302; Crane v. Hardman, 4 E. D. Smith,
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448; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, Baldw., 536-3d Cir.·

Pa.)"
This case was affirmed as to the account stated and reversed as to the question of interest payments and other
matters not controlling here in 82 US 250, 15 Wall 562.

A few years later in Benites v. Hampton, 3 Utah 369
( 18 84) , this court paid recognition to the rul~ that a lapse
of a reasonable time without objection creates an account
stated.
Again in ·1900 in Burraston v. First National Bank of
Nephi, 22 Utah 328, this court applied the rule of an
account stated. The plaintiff deposited money in ·the bank,
drew checks and signed notes to the bank, but made no
objection to the statements sent by the. bank to him from
time to time. Even when his account was closed he made
no objection to the final statement sent by the bank until
some three years later. This court held that an account
stated ended plaintiff's right of action and defendant's
motion for a non-suit should have been granted.
The foregoing cases are in point with the undisputed
facts in our case. Since the facts are undisputed and clear
as to the events subsequent to the letter of January 10,
1950, the weight of authority holds that what constitutes
a reasonable time within which objection must be made to
an account rendered in order to preclude a presumption
of acquiescence therein is always a question exclusively for
the court. 18 A.L.R. 887, 895: ccWhat is a reasonable time
where the facts are clear, is always a question exclusively
for the court." The Annotation in 18 A.L.R. 887 is:
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.u'Wbat is a reasonable time within which to object to an
a(fcount so as to prevent its becoming an account stated."
See Subheadings page 888 et seq.
The legal principle of accord and .s·atisfaction is also
applicable to the facts in this case. Defendant alleged
this defense in the motion for a directed verdict in the
alternative with· an account stated and the authorities have
applied'both in such cases.

In California Bean Growers' Association v. Rindge
Land & Navigation Company, 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R.
904, (Cal. 1926) the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff, a marketing association, against a defendant member for liquidated damages as specified in a contract for failure of defendant member to deliver certain
bean crops. As to the defendant"s counter-claim the court
found there had been an account stated and an accord and
satisfaction.
c:In answer to the defendant's cross-complaint, which contains the same matters set up as a
set-off and as a counterclaim the plaintiff, in addition to denials of such matters, alleged, and the
court found, that there had been an account stated
between the parties and an accord and satisfaction
as to the proceeds of the 1918 crop of beans. ·
u

* * *
~c:

cDuring the time the beans were held in storage the plaintiff from time to time sent to defendant statements of sales made and of charges debited
to the defenda~t's. account, such as insurance,
~leaning, and resacking beans, patching sacks, etc.,
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and the defendant often replied with complaints
that the charges were excessive. September 16,
1920, defendant wrote plaintiff, demanding a settlement, and, among other things, saying: tYour
auditor,s report which was submitted to us some
time ago made the amazing statement that the
money realized from the 1918 beans was actually
used to :finance the 1919 crop. This seems to us
incredible. If true, the directors have made themselves personally responsible, as they undoub_tedly
did by refusing to sell the beans when a good price
was offered early in 1919. We shall be obliged to
take legal steps along these lines if a check is not
promptly sent to us. We shall also take very decided exceptions to your expense accounts as· they
are extravagant beyond all reason. You have no
right under the agreement to deduct more than
$1.00 per ton for such expenses, and § 4 provides
for the return of any unused portions of the $1.00
per ton., Thereafter the plaintiff furnished the
defendant with a complete statement of all receipts
and disbursements in connection with the defendant's 1918 beans, showing that all of such beans,
except 3,500 pounds which were damaged, had
been sold, and that.the defendant had been credited
with a net balance on account of beans sold in the
sum of $22,744.72.

* * *
uNovember 29, 1920, the plaintiff sent the
defendant a check for $22,744.73, inclosed with
a letter reading as follows: · tWe have pleasure in
inclosing herewith our check No. 2525 'for $22,744.73 representing a final settlement of the 1918
a·ccount, with the exception of two small lots which
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ment which we recently forwarded to. you.' On
the followmg .day the defendant acknowledged
receipt of the check in a letter. reading as follows:
tWe are in receipt of your letter of November 29th,
inclosing your check No. 3536 for $22~744.73.'
February 24, 1951, plaintiff wrote defendant, inclosing statement of sale of the damaged: beans and
a check for the net proceeds thereof, amounting to
$66.51, and saying: (This amount represents the
final settlement on your 1918 account ..' The defendant cashed the first check November 30, 1920,
and the second one February 26, 1921. The record
does not show that the defendant made any objection to. the settlement until its answer was :filed
herein August 18, 1921.
tThe foregoing evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the court to the effect that
there was an .account stated between the parties
and an accord and satisfaction. Berger v. Lane,
190 Cal. 443, 447, 213 Pac. 45; Lapp-Gifford Co.
v. MuscoyWaterCo. 166Cal. 25, 27, 134Pac. 989;
Creighton v. Gregory, 142 Cal. 34, 39, 75 Pac.
569; Schneider ·v. Oakman Consol. .Min. Co. 38
Cal. App. 338, 3.42, 176 P.a.c. 177; Johnston v.
Burnett,.17 Cal. App. 497, 120 Pac. 436, 34 A.L.R.
1036, note.
·
u

* * *
uln defendant's letter of September 16, 1920,
it said: «you have no right under the agreement to
deduct more than $1 per ton for such expenses,
.and § 4 provides for the return of any unused
portions of the $1 per ton.' It must be presumed,
therefore, that the settlement disposed of that
controversy. The payments of November 29, 1920,
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and February 24, 1921, were made expressly as ca
final settlement of the 1918 account,' ,and it must
be presumed that the settlement included all credits
to which the defendant was entitled. The stated
account and the accord and satisfaction are not
attacked on the ground of fraud or mistake in
the procurement thereof."
We have cited from this case ~at considerable length due
to the similarity in facts to our case. It appears from the
cases that if no real dispute as to the account as rendered
existed, or if acquiescence is presumed from lack of objection for a reasonable time, an .account is stated and plaintiff
is precluded from recovery. If it appears that any dispute
existed and payment is made thereon and defendant indicates that it is in :final settlement, the acceptance of such
by the plaintiff constitutes accord and satisfactiol). This is
well set out in Wpllace v. Crawford, 69 P. 2d 455 (Cal.
1937), where an accounting on rice payments was sent
and received and showed . the amount sold to defendant
by plaintiff together with a check for that amount. It was
held that such constituted ~n account stated and accord·
and satisfaction:
ult is a general rule of law that the acceptance
of payment of a balance shown to be due on an
account rendered by a debtor to his creditor ordinarily constitutes an account stated as against the
party accepting the payment which precludes the
creditor from thereafter questioning the accuracy
of the account. Hansen v. Fresno Jersey Farm
Dairy Company, 220 Cal. 402, 31 P. (2d) 359;
1 C.J. 689 § 270.

* * *
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38
u* * In 1 California Jurisprudence, p. 134, §
10, it is said: <The great weight of authority in
Americ,an courts undoubtedly supports the rule
· that where the amount due is in dispute and a check
for an amount less than that claimed is sent to
the creditor with a statement that it is sent in full
satisfaction of the claim, and the tender is accomplished by such acts or declarations ,as amount
to a condition that if the check is accepted at all it
is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed
claim, and the creditor so understands, its acceptance by the creditor constitutes an accord and
satisfaction, even though the creditor states at the
time that the amount tendered is not accepted in
full satisfaction.' "
.

The general rule of law announced in the California
Bean Growers' Association case, supra, was approved by
this court in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 1073,
(1935). At page 496 of the Utah reports this court.noted
the elements of accord and satisfaction:
uAppellant next urges that the delivery by
him to Ford Bros. of the cashier's check for $2,500,
indorsed as the evidence shows it was, which they
have not returned but continue to hold, constituted an accord and satisfaction of any claim which
they had against him for the money collected on
the Foss account, and that he was therefore entitled to judgment. Before there can ·be an accord
and satisfaction by acceptance of a less sum than
claimed, there must be an unliquidated claim or a
bona fide disp~te as to the amount thereof. It is
not necessary for the claim to be well founded, but
it must be made in ·good faith, otherwise there is
no consideration for an agreement to accept a less
sum, and the agreement is void. See 1 C. J. 551 to
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556, §§ 71 to 77; Page on Contracts,§§ '615 to 620;
Williston on Contracts § 129; Gray v. Bullen, 50
Utah 270, 167 P. 683, Robwer v. Burrell, 42 Utah
510, 134 P. 573; Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211,
125 P. 412, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 113."

These principles are recognized in the following cases:
RAlph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n.,
94 Utah 97,75 P. 2d 669 (1938); Browning v. Equitable
Life .Assur. Soc. of the United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.
\
2d 1060 (Utah, 1937); Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.,
90 Utah 405, 64 P. 2nd 351 (Utah, 1937); Bell v. Jones,
100 Utah 87, 110 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1941). 1 Am. Jur.
225-6, § 24 of the Chapter on Accord and Satisfaction
has this to say, and without qualification:

uThe creditor to whom a check is sent or
other remittance made as payment in full has the
option either of accepting it on the conditions on
which it is sent, or of rejecting it. When· a claim
is in dispute, and the debtor sends to his creditor a
check or other remittance which he clearly states is
in full payment of the claim, and the creditor accepts the remittance or collects the check without
objection it is generally recognized that this constitutes a good accord and satisfaction. The· moment the creditor indorses and collects the check,
with knowledge that it was .offered only upon
condition, .he thereby agrees to the condition and
is estopped from denying such agreement. It is
then that the minds of the parties meet and the contract of accord and satisfaction becomes complete.
It is not necessary that it be shown that the creditor
knows the legal effect of his acceptance of the
check, as the mere acceptance will be regarded as
assent."
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Section 26 of the same authority at pages 228-229
states the further rule that the fact that the creditor protests against accepting the tender in full payment will not
prevent the transaction from constituting a good accord
and satisfaction, and even if it is accepted under the
mistake of law that it will not operate as a satisfaction.
Section 29 at page 230 points out that .even the retention
of a check for an unreasonable le~gth. of time without returning it might constitute full satisfaction. And. the
conclusiveness of accord and satisfaction is found in Sec~
tion 72 at pages 255 to 256:

((As inherent in the definition, an accord and
satisfaction operates as a final bar to the demand
or subject-matter of the agreement for accord and
satisfaction. And where the accord or new agreement itself is accepted in satisfaction, no action can
be maintained on the old obligation. As a consequence, a valid accord and satisfaction renders unnecessary a consideration of the defense of the
Statute of Frauds or of· any defense on the merits
to the items which were originally in dispute.
Moreover, a debt which is satisfied by an accord
and satisfaction is extinguished for all purposes and
cannot constitute the consideration for a new
promise to pay the balance."
Reference is made in the foregoing citations to the
annotation in 75 ALR at page 905. ((Acceptance by check
purporting to be cin full' or accompanied by indications
of debtor,s intention that it be so regarded." This annotation supplements the same annotation in 34 ALR 1035
and both are referreq to in State et al v. Campbell Bldg.
Co.,. et al, 94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341 (Utah, 1938). The
·general rule in 34 ALR at page 1036 is given:
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uBy the great weight of authority the acceptance and use of a remittance by check, purporting
to be tin full,' or employing words of simila~ import, or accompanied by a letter to that effect,
amount to an accord and satisfaction of the larger
claim of the creditor, assuming that the claim was
unliquidated or disputed, so that an express agree.ment to accept, and the actual acceptan.ce of, the
smaller amount in full satisfaction, would have
been binding."
75 ALR 905 provides:

uThe following cases reiterate and follow the
general rule announced in the earlier annotation,
to the effect that the acceptance and use of a remittance by check, purporting to be fin full,·' or
employing words of similar import, or accompanied
by a letter to that effect, .constitute an accord and
satisfaction of the larger claim of the creditor, assuming that the claim was unliquidated or disputed,
so that an express agreement to accept, and the
actual acceptance of, the smaller amount. in full
satisfaction, would have been binding."
The cases cited therein are also so numerous as to
prohibit excerpting them, and the illustrations provide
many, many cases directly in point with our instant case,
all holding an accord and satisfaction proved.
We respectfully submit that appellant's facts place
him squarely into an account stated or an accord and
satisfaction, and he is estopped to deny it. His account
was· computed according to the 1949 bonus and is presumed and conclusive when he cashed the checks and failed
to object within a reasonable time, such account being
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considered. liquidated from the time it was rendered. W m~
S. .God be v. Brigham Young et al, supra. If Scoville claims
such account was disputed, then his cashing of the check
representing the balance due for his bonus for 1949 constituted an accord and satisfaction.
We have stated that the evidence is undisputed as to
the facts establishing an account stated or accord and
satisfaction and such are established without any of the
testimony claimed by appellant to have· been wrongly excluded. Even if such testimony were admitted it would
be of little aid to appellant, for it would likewise conclusively establish accord and satisfaction for appellant's only
contention is that· it cctended" to establish a dispute prior
to the receipt of his account and the checks which checks
he cashed without protest.

CONCLUSION
The record clearly shows: That all alleged conversations between Mr.. Scoville and Mr. Williams or Mr. Borsum were· offered by appellant in an attempt to vary,
modify or abrogate the 1949 writing. That these conversations were prior to the receipt and acknowledgment of the
1949 writing~ That counsel for appellant advised the court
during the trial that the very purpose of such conversation
was to vary the 1949 written contract not received until
some time after the conversation took place. The trial
court was en titled to rely upon the statement of plaintiff's
counsel in considering the admissibility of the conversations. That the conversations themselves, read separately
or cons~dered as a whole, and indulging in all the inferences
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for which appellant contends, do not elevate themselves
to the dignity of an agreement, separate and distinct from
the writings introduced into evidence. The undisputed
evidence clearly shows that Mr. Scoville accepted the
terms of the 1949 writing and his conduct and actions
preclude any contention on his part of non-assent.
Under the law and the facts in this case, these alleged
conversations were clearly inadmissible and the trial court
properly granted defendant's motion to strike them as
violating the rule against parol evidence.
Not only were the alleged conversations with Mr.
Borsum inadmissible because they violate the parol evidence rule, they were subject to the further objection
that they were offered in an attempt to bind Kellogg Sales
Company when no adequate showing of his authority to
so bind was made. The burden of proof was appellant's
and no conjecture as to why such proof is lacking, or that
such proof is provided by inferences, is sufficient to sustain
that burden. Nor can the hearsay evidence of Mr. Scoville
as to what the purported agent himself told him fill the
gap. In fact, the alleged conversation in Minneapolis actually negatives the cloak of authority and indicates that Mr.
Borsum would lose his job if he assumed it. The trial
court properly granted defendant's motion to strike such
testimony.
All of the evi~ence, either with or without the excluded testimony, establishes an account stated or accord
and satisfaction. The 1949 writing was unambiguous
and the evidence shows its receipt. Mr. Scoville received
an accounting in accordance with its terms, and if he did
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not then dispute such account and the evidence is clear
that he. thereafter received, ·endorsed and cashed checks
for payments in accordance with the account, an account
is stated and he is- precluded from recovery. His alleged
conversations lend him no comfort, for if they infer anything, they either infer a dispute or they don't and if a.
dispute in fact existed, then accord and satisfaction is conclusive upon him. All of the facts and circumstances of
this case are clear in the record. No conjecture is needed
and the pattern is distinct. The trial court properly applied the law governing all the evidence adduced and
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Attorneys for Defendtmt
a11,d Respondent
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